Cloaking, Detonation, and Client-side Phishing Detection

Today, most browsers integrate security services that attempt to protect users from phishing attacks: for Microsoft’s Edge, the service is Defender SmartScreen, and for Chrome, Firefox, and many derivatives, it’s Google’s Safe Browsing. URL Reputation services do what you’d expect — they return a reputation based on the URL, and the browser will warn/block loadingContinue reading “Cloaking, Detonation, and Client-side Phishing Detection”

Beware: URLs are Pointers to Mutable Entities

Folks often like to think of URLs as an entity that can be evaluated: “Is it harmless, or is it malicious?” In particular, vendors of security products tend to lump URLs in with other IoCs (indicators of compromise) like the hash of a known-malicious file, a malicious/compromised digital certificate, or a known-malicious IP address. Unfortunately,Continue reading “Beware: URLs are Pointers to Mutable Entities”

Attack Techniques: Fullscreen Abuse

It’s extremely difficult to prevent attacks when there are no trustworthy pixels on the screen, especially if a user doesn’t realize that none of what they’re seeing should be trusted. Unfortunately for the browsing public, the HTML5 Fullscreen API can deliver this power to an attacker. Today (and for over a decade now), an attackingContinue reading “Attack Techniques: Fullscreen Abuse”

The Challenge of IP Reputation

When protecting clients and servers against network-based threats, it’s tempting to consider the peer’s network address when deciding whether that peer is trustworthy. Unfortunately, while IP addresses can be a valuable signal, attempts to treat traffic as trustworthy or untrustworthy based on IP address alone can be very prone to mistakes. Background Most clients andContinue reading “The Challenge of IP Reputation”

Attack Techniques: QR Codes

As outlined in earlier posts in this series, attackers know that security software can detect their phishing lures and block users from even seeing the lure if it contains a known-phishing URL. For example, both Windows Live and Gmail block email that is believed to contain phishing links. If your enterprise uses Microsoft Defender forContinue reading “Attack Techniques: QR Codes”

Enforcing SmartScreen with Policy

Microsoft Defender SmartScreen provides protection against the most common forms of attack: phishing and malware. SmartScreen support is built-in to Microsoft Edge and the Windows 8+ shell. The SmartScreen web service also powers the Microsoft Defender Browser Protection extension for Chromium-derived browsers. While SmartScreen provides powerful controls to block attacks, the user remains in fullContinue reading “Enforcing SmartScreen with Policy”

Attack Techniques: SMS Gift Card Scams

Last week, I had the chance to fly to Redmond to meet my new teammates on the Protection team in Microsoft Defender. I also had the chance to catch up with a few old friends from the Edge team, one of whom I met for coffee on Friday morning. As we sat down with ourContinue reading “Attack Techniques: SMS Gift Card Scams”

Improving the Microsoft Defender Browser Protection Extension

Earlier this year, I wrote about various extensions available to bolster your browser’s defenses against malicious sites. Today, let’s look at another such extension: the Microsoft Defender Browser Protection extension. I first helped out with extension back in 2018 when I was an engineer on the Chrome Security team, and this spring, I was taskedContinue reading “Improving the Microsoft Defender Browser Protection Extension”

Attack Techniques: Spoofing via UserInfo

I received the following phishing lure by SMS a few days back: The syntax of URLs is complicated, and even tech-savvy users often misinterpret them. In the case of the URL above, the actual site’s hostname is brefjobgfodsebsidbg.com, and the misleading http://www.att.net:911 text is just a phony username:password pair making up the UserInfo component ofContinue reading “Attack Techniques: Spoofing via UserInfo”

Attack Techniques: Open Redirectors, CAPTCHAs, Site Proxies, and IPFS, oh my

The average phishing site doesn’t live very long– think hours rather than days or weeks. Attackers use a variety of techniques to try to keep ahead of the Defenders who work tirelessly to break their attack chains and protect the public. Defenders have several opportunities to interfere with attackers: Each of these represents a weakContinue reading “Attack Techniques: Open Redirectors, CAPTCHAs, Site Proxies, and IPFS, oh my”