Starting in Edge 77 (and Chrome 77), the prompt shown when launching an AppProtocol from the browser was changed to remove the “Always allow” checkbox. That change was made, in large part, because this prompt is the only thing standing between every arbitrary site on the Internet (loaded inside your browser’s sandbox) and a full-trust application on your computer (running outside of the browser’s sandbox). See the prior blog post for details on why AppProtocols are so scary.
After Edge 77, when you try to launch a Microsoft Teams meeting, for instance, you’ll see a UI like this:
Unfortunately, there’s a downside to this security improvement.
The same prompt that protects users from malicious content on https://BadGuy.example also shows every single time the legitimate Microsoft Teams website tries to open its related application. Users complain that the security prompt feels redundant, and IT departments have howled that they’ll have to retrain users and field helpdesk calls.
Starting in Edge 82.0.425.0 Canary, a new flag is available:
Visit edge://flags/#edge-exclude-schemes-per-origin, set the flag to Enabled, and restart the browser. After doing so, you’ll see that the prompt now includes a new checkbox: “Always allow <hostname> to open links of this type in the associated app”:
By storing exemptions on a per-site, per-scheme basis, attack surface is significantly reduced, because only sites you’ve specifically allowed in the past are permitted to bypass the prompt.
Some notes on this change:
Exemptions are stored on a per-scheme, per-origin basis (e.g. “Allow teams: from https://teams.microsoft.com“, so if multiple origins use the same scheme, you’ll need to exempt each one.
Stored exemptions are origin specific: “https://site.example” and “https://www.site.example” and “http://site.example” are all different origins.
Stored exemptions are only available for HTTP and HTTPS origins.
In a future release, we expect to turn this flag on by default.
At present, there is no Group Policy for an admin to push exemptions to the client.
To clear stored exemptions, you may continue to use the “Cookis and other site data” checkbox in the Clear Browsing Data dialog box. Note that you can set the time range to anything you like– all Origin+Scheme exemptions will be cleared.
All major browsers have a built-in password manager. So we should use them, right?
I use my browser’s password manager because it’s convenient: with sync, I get all of my passwords on all of my devices.
This convenience means that I can use a different password for every website, improving my security.
This convenience means that my passwords can be long and hard to type, because I never have to do so.
This means that I don’t even know my own passwords for many sites, and because I can rely on my password manager to only fill my passwords on the sites to which they belong, I cannot succumb to a phishing attack.
The easy answer is “Yes, use your browser’s password manager!“
The more nuanced answer begins: “Tell me about your threat model?”
As when evaluating almost any security feature, my threat model might not match your threat model, and as a consequence, our security choices might be different.
Here are the most relevant questions to consider when thinking about whether you should use a password manager:
Is a password manager available for your platform(s)?
What sort of attackers are you worried about?
What sort of websites do you log into?
Do you select strong, unique passwords?
Are your accounts protected with 2FA?
What sort of attacks are most likely?
What sort of attacks are possible?
How do you protect your devices?
What’s your personal tolerance for inconvenience?
Are you confident in the security of your password manager’s vendor?
If you sync passwords, are you confident in the security of the design of the sync system?
The answers to these questions might change your decisions about whether to use a password manager, and if so, whether you want to use the built-in password manager or use a password manager provided by a third-party.
For instance, if you’re sharing a Windows/Mac OS login account with someone you don’t trust, you should stop. If you cannot or don’t want to, you should not use a password manager, because there are trivial ways for a local user steal your passwords one-at-a-time and simple ways to steal them all at once. Of course, even if you’re not using a password manager, a co-user can simply use a keylogger to steal your passwords one-by-one as you type them.
Lock (Win+L) your computer when you’re not using it.
While browser passwords are encrypted on disk, they’re encrypted using a key available to any process on your PC, including any locally-running malware. Even if passwords are encrypted in a “vault” by a master key, they’ll be decrypted when loaded in the browser’s memory space and can be harvested after you unlock the vault. Locally-running malware is particularly dire if your threat model includes the possibility of a worm running rampant within your enterprise– it could infect all of your employees’ machines and steal all of their passwords in bulk in seconds. (Yes, dear reader, I know that you’re thinking of clever mechanisms to mitigate these sorts of attacks. I assure you I can defeat every practical idea you have. It’s a fundamental law of computing.)
Concern about instantaneous bulk egress of credentials has led the authors of security configuration guidance to recommend disabling browser password managers. For instance, the Edge Security Baseline and the Chrome STIG both suggest preventing users from using the password manager. (I personally think this is a poor tradeoff that increases the higher risk of individual users getting phished, but I don’t write the configuration guidance.)
Some tech elites advocate for using a 3rd-party password manager, and some users really like them. Most 3rd-party password managers are designed with broader feature sets to satisfy alternative threat models (including using master passwords to help protect against limited local attackers). Many also include additional conveniences like automatic generation of strong passwords and roaming of passwords to mobile platforms and apps. On the other hand, many external password manager applications are themselves a source of security vulnerabilities, and these products often end up growing extremely complicated due to the “Checkbox Wars” endemic to the security products industry.
When that’s not yet possible (because you don’t control the website): choose strong passwords, use a password manager if it satisfies your threat model, and enable 2FA if available (especially on your email accounts to which password recovery emails are sent).
I started building browser extensions more than 22 years ago, and I started building browsers directly just over 16 years ago. At this point, I think it’s fair to say that I’m entering the grizzled veteran phase of my career.
With the Edge team continuing to grow with bright young minds from college and industry, I’m increasingly often asked “Where do I learn about browsers?” and I haven’t had a ready answer for that question.
This post aims to answer it.
First, a few prerequisites for developing expertise in browsers:
Curiosity. While browsers are more complicated than ever, there are also better resources than ever to learn how they work. All major browsers are now based on open-source code, and if you’re curious, you no longer need to join a secret priesthood to discover how they operate under the hood.
Willingness to Experiment. Considering how complex browsers are (and because they’re so diverse, across platforms, maker, and version), it’s often easiest to definitively answer questions about how browsers work by trying things, rather than reading an explainer (possibly outdated or a map that doesn’t match the terrain) or reading the code (often complex and potentially misleading). Build test cases and try them in each browser to see what happens. When you encounter surprisingbehavior, let your curiosity guide you into figuring it out. Browsers contain no magic, but plenty of butterfly effects.
Doggedness. I’ve been doing this for half of my life, and I’m still learning daily. While historical knowledge will serve you well, things are changing in this space every day, and keeping up is an endless challenge. And it’s often fun.
Now, how do you apply these prerequisites and grow to become a master of browsers? Read on.
Over the years, a variety of broad resources have been developed that will give you a good foundation in the fundamentals of how browsers work. Taking advantage of these will help you more effectively explore and learn on your own.
First, I recommend reading the Chrome Comic Book. This short, 38 page comic book from legend Scott McCloud was published alongside the first version of Google Chrome back in 2008. It clearly and simply explains many of the core concepts behind modern browsers as application platforms.
HTML5Rocks has a great introduction into How Browsers Work. This is a lengthy and detailed introduction into how browsers turn HTML and CSS into what you see on the screen. Read this article and you’ll understand more about this topic than 90% of web developers.
The Chromium Chronicle is a monthly series geared specifically to the Chromium developers who build the browser.
Web Developers should check out Web.Dev, a great source of articles on building fast and secure websites.
If you prefer to learn from books, I can only recommend a few. Sadly, there are few on browsers themselves (largely because they tend to evolve too quickly), but there are good books on web technologies.
The fact that all of the major browsers are built atop open-source projects is a wonderful thing. No longer do you need to be a reverse-engineering ninja with a low-level debugger to figure out how things are meant to work (although sometimes such approaches can still be super-valuable).
While simply perusing a browser’s source code might give you a good feel for the project, browsers tend to be enormous. Chromium is over 10 million lines of code, for example.
If you need to find something in particular, one often effective way to find it easily is to search for a string shown in the browser UI near the feature of interest. (Or, if you’re searching for a DOM function name or HTML attribute name, try searching for that.) We might call this method string chasing.
By way of example, today I encountered an unexpected behavior in the handling of the “Go to <url>” command on Chromium’s context menu:
So, to find the code that implements this feature, I first try searching for that string:
…but there are a gazillion hits, which makes it hard to find what I need. So I instead search for a string that’s elsewhere in the context menu, and find only one hit in the Chromium “grd” (resources) file:
When I go look at that grd file, I quickly find the identifier I’m really looking for just below my search result:
So, we now know that we’re looking for usages of IDS_CONTENT_CONTEXT_GOTOURL, probably in a .CC file, and we find that almost immediately:
From here, we see that the menu item has the command identifier IDC_CONTENT_CONTEXT_GOTOURL, which we can then continue to chase down through the source until we find the code that handles the command. That command makes use of a variable selection_navigation_url_, which is filled elsewhere by some pretty complicated logic.
After you gain experience in the Chromium code, you might learn “Oh, yeah, all of the context menu stuff is easy to find, it’s in the renderer_context_menu directory” and limit your searches to that area, but after four years of working on Chrome, I still usually start my searches broadly.
You can compile Chromium or Firefox on a mid-range machine from 2016, but it will take quite a long time. A beefy PC will speed things up a bunch, but until we have cloud compilers available to the public, it’s always going to be pretty slow.
Look at their Bugs
All browsers except Microsoft Edge have a public bug tracker where you can search for known issues and file new bugs if you encounter them.
Microsoft Edge‘s – Platform bugs that are inherited from Chromium are tracked using CRBug. Sadly, at present there is no public tracker for bugs that reproduce only in Edge. Bugs reported by the “Feedback” button are tracked internally by Microsoft.
Public data reveals each point of marketshare in the browser market is worth at least$100,000,000 USD annually (most directly in the form of payments from the browser’s configured search engine).
Remembering this fact will help you understand many other things, from how browsers pay their large teams of expensive software engineers, to how they manage to give browsers away for free, to why certain features behave the way that they do.
Calling this API results in the user’s default browser being opened and a new tab navigated to the target URL.
This same simple approach works great on most operating systems and with virtually any browser a user might have configured as their default.
…Unless It’s Not
Unfortunately, this well-lit path adjoins a complexity cliff— if your scenario has requirements beyond the basic [Launch the default browser to this URL], things get much more challenging. The problem is that there is no API contract that provides a richer feature set and works across different browsers.
For instance, consider the case where you’d like your app to direct the browser to POST a form to a target server. Today, popular operating systems have no such concept– they know how to open a browser by passing it a URL, but they expose no API that says “Open the User’s browser to the following URL, sending the navigation request via the HTTP POST method and containing the following POST body data.”
For instance, if the target webservice simply requires a HTTP POST and you cannot change it, your app could launch the browser to a webpage you control, passing the required data in the querystring component of a HTTP GET. Your web server could then reformat the data into the required POST body format and either proxy that request (server-side) to the target webservice, or it could return a web page with an auto-submitting form element with a method of POST and and action attribute pointed at the target webservice. The user’s browser will submit the form, posting the data to the target server.
Similarly, a more common approach involves having the app write a local HTML file in a temporary folder, then direct the Operating System to open that file using the appropriate API (again ShellExecute, in the case of Windows). Presuming that the user’s default HTML handler is also their default HTTPS protocol handler, opening the file will result in the default browser opening, and the HTML/script in the file will automatically submit the included form element to the target server. This “bounce through a local temporary form” approach has the advantage of making it possible to submit sizable of data to the server (e.g. the contents of a local file), unlike using a GET request’s size-limited querystring.
Unfortunately it is generally not possible to construct a HTML form that will submit a data field that exactly matches what you would get when sending an <input type=file> control. If the web service demands a format that was generated by a file upload control, you may not be able to emulate that.
If your scenario requires uploading files, an alternative approach is to:
Upload the files directly from your app to a web service
Have that web service return a secret token associated with the upload
Have your app spawn a browser with a GET request whose querystring contains that secret token
Back in the Windows 7 days, the IE8 team created a very cool feature called Accelerators that would allow users to invoke web services in their browser from any other application. Interestingly, the API contract supported web services that required POST requests.
Because there was no API in Windows that supported launching the default browser with anything other than a URL, a different approach was needed. A browser that wished to participate as a handler for accelerators could implement a IOpenServiceActivityOutputContext::Navigate function which was expected to launch the browser and pass the data. The example implementation provided by our documentation called into Internet Explorer’s Navigate2() COM API, which accepted as a parameter the POST body to be sent in the navigation. As far as I know, no other browser ever implemented IOpenServiceActivityOutputContext.
These days, Accelerators are long dead, and no one should be using Internet Explorer anymore. In the intervening years, no browser-agnostic mechanism to transfer a POST request from an app to a browser has been created.
Perhaps the closest we’ve come is the W3C’s WebDriver Standard, designed for automated testing of websites across arbitrary browsers. Unfortunately, at present, there’s still no way for mainstream apps to take a dependency on WebDriver to deliver a reliable browser-agnostic solution enabling rich transfers from a local app to a web app.
While the current picture is bleak, the future is a bit brighter. That’s because a major goal of browsers’ investment in Progressive Web Apps is to make them rich enough to take the place of native apps. Today’s native apps have very rich mechanisms for passing data and files to one another and PWAs will need such capabilities in order to achieve their goals.
Perhaps one day, not too far in the future, your OS and your browser (regardless of vendor) will better interoperate.
It’s an interesting time. Microsoft now maintains three different web browsers:
Internet Explorer 11
Microsoft Edge Legacy (Spartan, v18 and below)
Chromium-based Microsoft Edge (v79+)
If you’re using Internet Explorer 11, you should stop; sometimes, this is easier said than done.
If you’re using Legacy Microsoft Edge, you should upgrade to the new Microsoft Edge which is better in almost every way. When you install the Stable version of the new Microsoft Edge (either by downloading it or eventually by using WindowsUpdate), it will replace your existing Legacy Edge with the new version.
What if I still need to test in Legacy Edge?
If you’re a web developer and need to keep testing your sites and services in the legacy Microsoft Edge, you’ll need to set a registry key to prevent the Edge installer from removing the entry points to the old Edge.
Simply import this registry script before the new Edge is installed. When the AllowSxS key is set to 1, the new Edge installer will keep the old entry point, renaming it to “Microsoft Edge Legacy”:
Thereafter, you can use both versions of Edge on the same PC.
If you didn’t have this registry key set and your legacy Edge entry points have disappeared when you installed the new Edge, you can use the Add or Remove Programs applet in the system control panel to uninstall the new Edge, then set the registry key, then reinstall the new Edge.
Note: If you’re a Web Developer, you should also be testing in the Edge Beta or Edge Dev builds because these will allow you to see the changes coming to Edge before your users do. These builds install side-by-side (replacing no browser) and can be installed from https://MicrosoftEdgeInsider.com.
What if my company has sites that only work in Internet Explorer?
In order to help speed migration to the new Microsoft Edge, it offers an Internet Explorer Mode feature when running on Windows. IE Mode allows IT administrators to configure PCs running Windows 7, 8.1, and 10 such that specified sites will load inside a browser tab that uses the Internet Explorer 11 rendering engine.
IE Mode is not designed for or available to consumers.
Because IE Mode relies upon the IE11 binaries on the current machine, it is not available in Edge for MacOS, iOS, or Android.
IE Mode tabs run inside the legacy security sandbox (weaker than the regular Edge sandbox) and ActiveX controls like Silverlight are available to web pages.
IE Mode does not share a cache, cookies, or web storage with Microsoft Edge, so scenarios that depend upon using these storage mechanisms in a cross-site+cross-engine context will not work correctly. IT administrators should carefully set their policies such that user flows occur within a single engine.
Most Edge browser extensions will not work on IE Mode tabs–extensions which only look at the tab’s URL should work, but extensions which try to view or modify the page content will not function correctly.
In an ideal world, users will migrate to the latest version of Microsoft Edge as quickly as possible, and enjoy a faster, more compatible, more reliable browser. Nevertheless, Microsoft will continue to patch both Legacy Edge and Internet Explorer 11 according to their existing support lifecycle.
While I do most of my work in an office, from time to time I work on code changes to Chromium at home. With the recent deprecation of Jumbo Builds, building the browser on my cheap 2016-era Dell XPS 8900 (i7-6700K) went from unpleasant to impractical. While I pondered buying a high-end Threadripper, I couldn’t justify the high cost, especially given the limited performance characteristics for low-thread workloads (basically, everything other than compilation).
The introduction of the moderately-priced (nominally $750), 16 Core Ryzen 3950X hit the sweet spot, so I plunked down my credit card and got a new machine from a system builder. Disappointingly, it took almost two months to arrive in a working state, but things seem to be good now.
The AMD Ryzen 3950X has 16 cores with two threads each, and runs around 3.95ghz when they’re all fully-loaded; it’s cooled by a CyberPowerPC DeepCool Castle 360EX liquid cooler. An Intel Optane 905P 480GB system drive holds the OS, compilers, and Chromium code. The key advantage of the Optane over more affordable SSDs is that it has a much higher random read rate (~400% as fast as the Samsung 970 Pro I originally planned to use):
Atop Windows 10 1909, I disabled Windows Defender entirely, and didn’t do anything too taxing with the PC while the build was underway.
Ultimately, a clean build of the “chrome” target took just under 53 minutes, achieving 33.3x parallelism.
While this isn’t a fast result by any stretch of the definition, it’s still faster than my non-jumbo local build times back when I worked at Google in 2016/2017 and used a $6000 Xeon 48 thread workstation to build Chrome, at somewhere around half of the cost.
When I first joined Google, I learned about the seemingly magical engineering systems available to Googlers, quickly followed by the crushing revelation that most of those magic tools were not available to those of us working on the Chromium open-source project.
The one significant exception was that Google Chrome engineers had access to a distributed build system called “Goma” which would allow compiling Chrome using servers in the Google cloud. My queries around the team suggested that only a minority of engineers took advantage of it, partly because (at the time) it didn’t generate very debuggable Windows builds. Nevertheless, I eventually gave it a shot and found that it cut perhaps five minutes off my forty-five minute jumbo build times on my Xeon workstation. I rationalized this by concluding that the build must not be very parallelizable, and the fact that I worked remotely from Austin, so any build-artifacts from the Goma cloud would be much further away than from my colleagues in Mountain View.
Given the complexity of the configuration, I stopped using Goma, and spent perhaps half of my tenure on Chrome with forty-five minute build times. Then, one day I needed to do some development on my Macbook, and I figured its puny specs would benefit from Goma in a way my Xeon workstation never would. So I went back to read the Goma documentation and found a different reference than I saw originally. This one mentioned a then unknown to me “-j” command line argument that tells the build system how many cloud cores to use.
This new, better, documentation noted that by default the build system would just match your local core count, but when using Goma you should instead demand ~20x your local core count– so -j 960 for my workstation. With one command line argument, my typical compiles dropped from 45 minutes to around 6.
Returning to Edge
I returned to Microsoft as a Program Manager on the Edge team in mid-2018, unaware that replatforming atop Chromium was even a possibility until the day before I started. Just before I began, a lead sent me a 27 page PDF file containing the Edge-on-Chromium proposal. “What do you think?” he asked. I had a lot of thoughts (most of the form “OMG, yes!“) but one thing I told everyone who would listen is that we would never be able to keep up without having a cloud-compilation system akin to Goma. The Google team had recently open-sourced the Goma client, but hadn’t yet open-sourced the cloud server component. I figured the Edge team had engineering years worth of work ahead of us to replicate that piece.
When an engineer on the team announced two weeks later that he had “MSGoma” building Chromium using an Azure cloud backend, it was the first strong sign that this crazy bet could actually pay off.
And pay off it has. While I still build locally from time to time, I typically build Chromium using MSGoma from my late 2018 Lenovo X1 Extreme laptop, with build times hovering just over ten minutes. Cloud compilation is a game changer.
The Chrome team has since released a Goma Server implementation, and several other major Chromium contributors are using distributed build systems of their own design.
I haven’t yet tried using MSGoma from my new Ryzen workstation, but I’ve been told that the Optane drive is especially helpful when performing distributed builds, due to the high incidence of small random reads.
 This experience recalled a much earlier one: my family moving to Michigan shortly after I turned 11. Our new house featured a huge yard. My dad bought a self-propelled lawn mower and my brother and I took turns mowing the yard weekly. The self-propelled mower was perhaps fifteen pounds heavier than our last mower, and the self-propelling system didn’t really seem to do much of anything.
After two years of weekly mows from my brother and I, my dad took a turn mowing. He pushed the lawn mower perhaps five feet before he said “That isn’t right,” reached under the control panel and flipped a switch. My brother and I watched in amazement and dismay as the mower began pulling him across the yard.
As a part of every page load, browsers have to make dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of decisions — should a particular API be available? Should a resource load be permitted? Should script be allowed to run? Should video be allowed to start playing automatically? Should cookies or credentials be sent on network requests? The list is long.
In many cases, decisions are governed by two inputs: a user setting, and the URL of the page for which the decision is being made.
In the old Internet Explorer web platform, each of these decisions was called an URLAction, and the ProcessUrlAction(url, action,…) API allowed the browser or another web client to query its security manager for guidance on how to behave.
To simplify the configuration for the user or their administrator, the legacy platform classified sites into five1 different Security Zones:
Users could use the Internet Control Panel to assign specific sites to Zones and to configure the permission results for each zone. When making a decision, the browser would first map the execution context (site) to a Zone, then consult the setting for that URLAction for that Zone to decide what to do.
Reasonable defaults like “Automatically satisfy authentication challenges from my Intranet” meant that most users never needed to change any settings away from their defaults.
In corporate or other managed environments, administrators can use Group Policy to assign specific sites to Zones (via “Site to Zone Assignment List” policy) and specify the settings for URLActions on a per-zone basis. This allowed Microsoft IT, for instance, to configure the browser with rules like “Treat https://mail.microsoft.com as a part of my Intranet and allow popups and file downloads without warning messages.“
Applications hosting Web Browser Controls, by default, inherit the Windows Zone configuration settings, meaning that changes made for Internet Explorer are inherited by other applications. In relatively rare cases, the host application might supply its own Security Manager and override URL Policy decisions for embedded Web Browser Control instances.
A Web Developer working on a site locally might find that it worked fine (Intranet Zone), but failed spectacularly for their users when deployed to production (Internet Zone).
Users were often completely flummoxed to find that the same page on a single server behaved very differently depending on how they referred to it — e.g. http://localhost/ (Intranet Zone) vs. http://127.0.0.1/ (Internet Zone).
A synchronous API call might need to know what Zone a caller is in, but determining that could, in the worst case, take tens of seconds — the time needed to discover the location of the proxy configuration script, download it, and run the FindProxyForUrl() function within it. This could lead to a hang and unresponsive UI.
A site’s Zone can change at runtime without restarting the browser (say, when moving a laptop between home and work networks, or when connecting or disconnecting from a VPN).
An IT Department might not realize the implications of returning DIRECT from a proxy configuration script and accidentally map the entire untrusted web into the highly-privileged Intranet Zone. (Microsoft IT accidentally did this circa 2011).
Some features like AppContainer Network Isolation are based on firewall configuration and have no inherent relationship to the browser’s Zone settings.
The legacy Edge browser (aka Spartan, Edge 18 and below) inherited the Zone architecture from its Internet Explorer predecessor with a few simplifying changes:
Windows’ five built-in Zones were collapsed to three: Internet (Internet), the Trusted Zone (Intranet+Trusted), and the Local Computer Zone. The Restricted Zone was removed.
Zone to URLAction mappings were hardcoded into the browser, ignoring group policies and settings in the Internet Control Panel.
Avoiding Zones in Chromium
Chromium goes further and favors making decisions based on explicitly-configured site lists and/or command-line arguments.
When deciding whether or not to release Windows Integrated Authentication (Kerberos/NTLM) credentials automatically.
Respect for Zones2 in Chromium remains controversial—the Chrome team has launched and abandoned plans to remove them a few times, but ultimately given up under the weight of enterprise compat concerns. Their arguments for complete removal include:
Zones are poorly documented, and Windows Zone behavior is poorly understood.
The performance/deadlock risks mentioned earlier (Intranet Zone mappings can come from a system-discovered proxy script).
Zones are Windows-only (meaning they prevent drop-in replacement of ChromeOS).
Drop all Referers when navigating from the Intranet to the Internet; leave Referers alone when browsing the Intranet.
Internet Explorer and legacy Edge will automatically send your client certificate to Intranet sites that ask for it. The AutoSelectCertificateForUrls policy permits Edge to send a client certificate to specified sites without a prompt, but this policy requires the administrator to manually list the sites.
Block all (or most) extensions from touching Intranet pages to reduce the threat of data leaks.
Guide all Intranet navigations into an appropriate profile or container (a la Detangle).
Upstream, there’s alongstanding desire to help protect intranets/local machine from cross-site-request-forgery attacks; blocking loads and navigations of private resources from the Internet Zone is somewhat simpler than blocking them from Intranet Sites.
At present, only AutoSelectCertificateForUrls, manual cookie controls, and mixed content nags support policy-pushed site lists, but their list syntax doesn’t have any concept of “Intranet” (dotless hosts, hosts that bypass proxy).
You’ll notice that each of these has potential security impact (e.g. an XSS on a privileged “Intranet” page becomes more dangerous; unqualified hostnames can result in name collisions), but having the ability to scope some features to only “Intranet” sites might also improve security by reducing attack surface.
As browser designers, we must weigh the enterprise impact of every change we make, and being able to say “This won’t apply to your intranet if you don’t want it to” would be very liberating. Unfortunately, building such an escape hatch is also the recipe for accumulating technical debt and permitting the corporate intranets to “rust” to the point that they barely resemble the modern public web.
Throughout Chromium, many features are designed respect an individual policy-pushed list of sites to control their behavior. If you were forward-thinking enough to structure your intranet such that your hostnames are of the form:
Congratulations, you’ve lucked into a best practice. You can configure each desired policy with a *.contoso-intranet.com entry and your entire Intranet will be opted in.
Unfortunately, while wildcards are supported, there’s presently no way (as far as I can tell) to express the concept of “any dotless hostname.”
Why is that unfortunate? For over twenty years, Internet Explorer and legacy Edge mapped domain names like https://payroll, https://timecard, and https://sharepoint/ to the Intranet Zone by default. As a result, many smaller companies have benefitted from this simple heuristic that requires no configuration changes by the user or the IT department.
Opportunity: Maybe such a DOTLESS_HOSTS token should exist in the Chromium policy syntax. TODO: figure out if this is worth doing.
Internet Explorer and Legacy Edge use a system of five Zones and 88+ URLActions to make security decisions for web content, based on the host of a target site.
Chromium (New Edge, Chrome) uses a system of Site Lists and permission checks to make security decisions for web content, based on the host of a target site.
There does not exist an exact mapping between these two systems, which exist for similar reasons but implemented using very different mechanisms.
In general, users should expect to be able to use the new Edge without configuring anything; many of the URLActions that were exposed by IE/Spartan have no logical equivalent in modern browsers.
If the new Edge browser does not behave in the desired way for some customer scenario, then we must examine the details of what isn’t working as desired to determine whether there exists a setting (e.g. a Group Policy-pushed SiteList) that provides the desired experience.
1 Technically, it was possible for an administrator to create “Custom Security Zones” (with increasing ZoneIds starting at #5), but such a configuration has not been officially supported for at least fifteen years, and it’s been a periodic source of never-to-be-fixed bugs.
2 Beyond those explicit uses of Windows’ Zone Manager, various components in Chromium have special handling for localhost/loopback addresses, and some have special recognition of RFC1918 private IP Address ranges (e.g. SafeBrowsing handling) and Network Quality Estimation.
Within Edge, the EMIE List is another mechanism by which sites’ hostnames may result in different handling.