Microsoft Family Safety is a feature of Windows that allows parents to control their children’s access to apps and content in Windows. The feature is tied to the user accounts of the parent(s) and child(ren). When I visit https://family.microsoft.com and log in with my personal Microsoft Account, I’m presented with the following view: The “Nate”Continue reading “Family Safety Content Filtering”
Tag Archives: Windows
Defensive Technology: Exploit Protection
September 2025 tl;dr: You probably should not touch Exploit Protection settings. This post explains what the feature does and how it works, but admins and end-users should probably just leave it alone to do what it does by default. Over the last several decades, the Windows team has added a stream of additional security mitigationContinue reading “Defensive Technology: Exploit Protection”
Best Practices for SmartScreen AppRep
Last year, I wrote about how Windows integrates SmartScreen Application Reputation to help ensure users have a secure and smooth experience when running downloaded software. tl;dr: When a user runs a downloaded program, a call to SmartScreen’s web-based reputation service is made, and four possible outcomes can occur: As a software developer, it’s natural thatContinue reading “Best Practices for SmartScreen AppRep”
Defensive Technology: Controlled Folder Access
Most client software’s threat models (e.g. Edge, Chrome) explicitly exclude threats where the local computer was compromised by malware. That’s because, without a trusted computing base, it’s basically impossible to be secure against attackers. This concept was immortalized decades ago in the Ten Immutable Laws of Security: In the intervening years, new technologies (like SecureContinue reading “Defensive Technology: Controlled Folder Access”
Leaky Abstractions
In the late 1990s, the Windows Shell and Internet Explorer teams introduced a bunch of brilliant and intricate designs that allowed extension of the shell and the browser to handle scenarios beyond what those built by Microsoft itself. For instance, Internet Explorer supported the notion of pluggable protocols (“What if some protocol, say, FTPS, becomesContinue reading “Leaky Abstractions”
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